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McAfee Labs
http://blogs.mcafee.com
Retrieved August 15, 2011
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Revealed: Operation Shady RAT
Download the PDF version of Operation Shady RAT report
For the last few years, especially since the public revelation of Operation Aurora,
the targeted successful intrusion into Google and two dozen other
companies, I have often been asked by our worldwide customers if they
should worry about such sophisticated penetrations themselves or if that
is a concern only for government agencies, defense contractors, and
perhaps Google. My answer in almost all cases has been unequivocal:
absolutely.
Having investigated intrusions such as Operation Aurora and Night Dragon
(systemic long-term compromise of Western oil and gas industry), as
well as numerous others that have not been disclosed publicly, I am
convinced that every company in every conceivable industry with
significant size and valuable intellectual property and trade secrets
has been compromised (or will be shortly), with the great majority of
the victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact. In fact, I
divide the entire set of Fortune Global 2000 firms into two categories:
those that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t yet know.
Lately,
with the rash of revelations about attacks on organizations such as
RSA, Lockheed Martin, Sony, PBS, and others, I have been asked by
surprised reporters and customers whether the rate of intrusions is
increasing and if it is a new phenomenon. I find the question ironic
because these types of exploitations have occurred relentlessly for at
least a half decade, and the majority of the recent disclosures in the
last six months have, in fact, been a result of relatively
unsophisticated and opportunistic exploitations for the sake of
notoriety by loosely organized political hacktivist groups such as
Anonymous and Lulzsec. On the other hand, the targeted
compromises — known as ‘Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs)’ (although
this term lately lost much of its original meaning due to overzealous
marketing tactics of various security companies, as well as to the
desire by many victims to call anything they discover being successful
at compromising their organizations as having been an APT) — we are
focused on are much more insidious and occur largely without public
disclosures. They present a far greater threat to companies and
governments, as the adversary is tenaciously persistent in achieving
their objectives. The key to these intrusions is that the adversary is
motivated by a massive hunger for secrets and intellectual property;
this is different from the immediate financial gratification that drives
much of cybercrime, another serious but more manageable threat.
What
we have witnessed over the past five to six years has been nothing
short of a historically unprecedented transfer of wealth — closely
guarded national secrets (including from classified government
networks), source code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation plans
and exploration details for new oil and gas field auctions, document
stores, legal contracts, SCADA configurations, design schematics and
much more has “fallen off the truck” of numerous, mostly Western
companies and disappeared in the ever-growing electronic archives of
dogged adversaries.
What is happening to all this data — by now
reaching petabytes as a whole — is still largely an open question.
However, if even a fraction of it is used to build better competing
products or beat a competitor at a key negotiation (due to having stolen
the other team’s playbook), the loss represents a massive economic
threat not just to individual companies and industries but to entire
countries that face the prospect of decreased economic growth in a
suddenly more competitive landscape and the loss of jobs in industries
that lose out to unscrupulous competitors in another part of the world,
not to mention the national security impact of the loss of sensitive
intelligence or defense information.
Yet, the public (and often
the industry) understanding of this significant national security threat
is largely minimal due to the very limited number of voluntary
disclosures by victims of intrusion activity compared to the actual
number of compromises that take place. With the goal of raising the
level of public awareness today we are publishing the most comprehensive
analysis ever revealed of victim profiles from a five year targeted
operation by one specific actor — Operation Shady RAT, as I have named it at McAfee (RAT is a common acronym in the industry which stands for Remote Access Tool).
This
is not a new attack, and the vast majority of the victims have long
since remediated these specific infections (although whether most
realized the seriousness of the intrusion or simply cleaned up the
infected machine without further analysis into the data loss is an open
question). McAfee has detected the malware variants and other relevant
indicators for years with Generic Downloader.x and Generic BackDoor.t
heuristic signatures (those who have had prior experience with this
specific adversary may recognize it by the use of encrypted HTML
comments in web pages that serve as a command channel to the infected
machine).
McAfee has gained access to one specific Command &
Control server used by the intruders. We have collected logs that reveal
the full extent of the victim population since mid-2006 when the log
collection began. Note that the actual intrusion activity may have begun
well before that time but that is the earliest evidence we have for the
start of the compromises. The compromises themselves were standard
procedure for these types of targeted intrusions: a spear-phishing email
containing an exploit is sent to an individual with the right level of
access at the company, and the exploit when opened on an unpatched
system will trigger a download of the implant malware. That malware will
execute and initiate a backdoor communication channel to the Command
& Control web server and interpret the instructions encoded in the
hidden comments embedded in the webpage code. This will be quickly
followed by live intruders jumping on to the infected machine and
proceeding to quickly escalate privileges and move laterally within the
organization to establish new persistent footholds via additional
compromised machines running implant malware, as well as targeting for
quick exfiltration the key data they came for.
After painstaking
analysis of the logs, even we were surprised by the enormous diversity
of the victim organizations and were taken aback by the audacity of the
perpetrators. Although we will refrain from explicitly identifying most
of the victims, describing only their general industry, we feel that
naming names is warranted in certain cases, not with the goal of
attracting attention to a specific victim organization, but to reinforce
the fact that virtually everyone is falling prey to these intrusions,
regardless of whether they are the United Nations, a multinational
Fortune 100 company, a small non-profit think-tank, a national Olympic
team, or even an unfortunate computer security firm.
In all, we
identified 71 compromised parties (many more were present in the logs
but without sufficient information to accurately identify them). Of
these, the breakdown of 32 unique organization categories follows:

And
for those who believe these compromises occur only in the United
States, Canada and Europe, allow me change that perception with the
following statistics on 14 geographic locations of the targets:

The
interest in the information held at the Asian and Western national
Olympic Committees, as well as the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
and the World Anti-Doping Agency in the lead-up and immediate follow-up
to the 2008 Olympics was particularly intriguing and potentially
pointed a finger at a state actor behind the intrusions, because there
is likely no commercial benefit to be earned from such hacks. The
presence of political non-profits, such as the a private western
organization focused on promotion of democracy around the globe or U.S.
national security think tank is also quite illuminating. Hacking the
United Nations or the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)
Secretariat is also not likely a motivation of a group interested only
in economic gains.
Another fascinating aspect that the logs have
revealed to us has been the changing tasking orders of the perpetrators
as the years have gone by. In 2006, the year that the logs begin, we saw
only eight intrusions: two on South Korean steel and construction
companies, and one each on a Department of Energy Research Laboratory, a
U.S. real-estate firm, international trade organizations of an Asian
and Western nations and the ASEAN Secretariat. (That last intrusion
began in October, a month prior to the organization’s annual summit in
Singapore, and continued for another 10 months.) In 2007, the pace of
activity jumped by a whopping 260 percent to a total of 29 victim
organizations. That year we began to see new compromises of no fewer
than four U.S. defense contractors, Vietnam’s government-owned
technology company, US federal government agency, several U.S. state and
county governments, and one computer network security company. The
compromises of the Olympic Committees of two nations in Asia and one
Western country began that year as well. In 2008, the count went up
further to 36 victims, including the United Nations and the World
Anti-Doping Agency, and to 38 in 2009. Then the number of intrusions
fell to 17 in 2010 and to 9 in 2011, likely due to the widespread
availability of the countermeasures for the specific intrusion
indicators used by this specific actor. These measures caused the
perpetrator to adapt and increasingly employ a new set of implant
families and command & control infrastructure (and causing activity
to disappear from the logs we have analyzed). Even news media was not
immune to the targeting, with one major U.S. news organization
compromised at its New York Headquarters and Hong Kong Bureau for more
than 21 months.
The shortest time that an organization remained
compromised was less than a single month; nine share that honor:
International Olympic Committee (IOC), Vietnam’s government-owned
technology company, trade organization of a nation in Asia, one Canadian
government agency, one US defense contractor, one US general government
contractor, one US state and one county government, and a US accounting
firm. I must, however, caution that this may not necessarily be an
indication of the rapid reaction of information security teams in those
organizations, but perhaps merely evidence that the actor was interested
only in a quick smash and grab operation that did not require a
persistent compromise of the victim. The longest compromise was recorded
at an Olympic Committee of a nation in Asia; it lasted on and off for
28 months, finally terminating in January 2010.
Below is the
complete list of all 71 targets, with country of origin, start date of
the initial compromise and duration of the intrusions:
| Victim |
Country |
Intrusion Start Date |
Intrusion Duration (Months) |
| South Korean Construction Company |
South Korea |
July 2006 |
17 |
| South Korean Steel Company |
South Korea |
July 2006 |
11 |
| Department of Energy Research Laboratory |
USA |
July 2006 |
3 |
| Trade Organization |
Country in Asia |
July 2006 |
1 |
| U.S. International Trade Organization |
USA |
September 2006 |
12 |
| ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Secretariat |
Indonesia |
October 2006 |
10 |
| U.S. Real-Estate Firm #1 |
USA |
November 2006 |
8 |
| Vietnam’s Government-owned Technology Company |
Vietnam |
March 2007 |
1 |
| U.S. Real-Estate Firm #2 |
USA |
April 2007 |
17 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #1 |
USA |
May 2007 |
21 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #2 |
USA |
May 2007 |
20 |
| U.S. Northern California County Government |
USA |
June 2007 |
7 |
| U.S. Southern California County Government |
USA |
June 2007 |
24 |
| U.S. State Government #1 |
USA |
July 2007 |
6 |
| U.S. Federal Government Agency #1 |
USA |
July 2007 |
8 |
| Olympic Committee of Asian Country #1 |
Country in Asia |
July 2007 |
28 |
| U.S. State Government #2 |
USA |
August 2007 |
1 |
| U.S. State Government #3 |
USA |
August 2007 |
25 |
| U.S. Federal Government Agency #2 |
USA |
August 2007 |
7 |
| Olympic Committee of Western Country |
Western Country |
August 2007 |
7 |
| Taiwanese Electronics Company |
Taiwan |
September 2007 |
8 |
| U.S. Federal Government Agency #3 |
USA |
September 2007 |
4 |
| U.S. Federal Government Agency #4 |
USA |
September 2007 |
8 |
| Western Non-profit Democracy-promoting Organization |
Western Country |
September 2007 |
4 |
| Olympic Committee of Asian Country #2 |
Country in Asia |
September 2007 |
7 |
| International Olympic Committee |
Switzerland |
November 2007 |
1 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #3 |
USA |
November 2007 |
7 |
| U.S. Network Security Company |
USA |
December 2007 |
3 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #4 |
USA |
December 2007 |
7 |
| U.S. Accounting Firm |
USA |
January 2008 |
1 |
| U.S. Electronics Company |
USA |
February 2008 |
13 |
| UK Computer Security Company |
United Kingdom |
February 2008 |
6 |
| U.S. National Security Think Tank |
USA |
February 2008 |
20 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #5 |
USA |
February 2008 |
9 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #6 |
USA |
February 2008 |
2 |
| U.S. State Government #4 |
USA |
April 2008 |
2 |
| Taiwan Government Agency |
Taiwan |
April 2008 |
8 |
| U.S. Government Contractor #1 |
USA |
April 2008 |
1 |
| U.S. Information Technology Company |
USA |
April 2008 |
7 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #7 |
USA |
April 2008 |
16 |
| U.S. Construction Company #1 |
USA |
May 2008 |
19 |
| U.S. Information Services Company |
USA |
May 2008 |
6 |
| Canadian Information Technology Company |
Canada |
July 2008 |
4 |
| U.S. National Security Non-Profit |
USA |
July 2008 |
8 |
| Denmark Satellite Communications Company |
Denmark |
August 2008 |
6 |
| United Nations |
Switzerland |
September 2008 |
20 |
| Singapore Electronics Company |
Singapore |
November 2008 |
4 |
| U.K. Defense Contractor |
United Kingdom |
January 2009 |
12 |
| U.S. Satellite Communications Company |
USA |
February 2009 |
25 |
| U.S. Natural Gas Wholesale Company |
USA |
March 2009 |
7 |
| U.S. Nevada County Government |
USA |
April 2009 |
1 |
| U.S. State Government #5 |
USA |
April 2009 |
3 |
| U.S. Agricultural Trade Organization |
USA |
May 2009 |
3 |
| U.S. Construction Company #2 |
USA |
May 2009 |
4 |
| U.S. Communications Technology Company |
USA |
May 2009 |
7 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #8 |
USA |
May 2009 |
4 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #9 |
USA |
May 2009 |
3 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #10 |
USA |
June 2009 |
11 |
| U.S. News Organization, Headquarters |
USA |
August 2009 |
8 |
| U.S. News Organization, Hong Kong Bureau |
Hong Kong |
August 2009 |
21 |
| U.S. Insurance Association |
USA |
August 2009 |
3 |
| World Anti-Doping Agency |
Canada |
August 2009 |
14 |
| German Accounting Firm |
Germany |
September 2009 |
10 |
| U.S. Solar Power Energy Company |
USA |
September 2009 |
4 |
| Canadian Government Agency #1 |
Canada |
October 2009 |
6 |
| U.S. Government Organization #5 |
USA |
November 2009 |
2 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #11 |
USA |
December 2009 |
2 |
| U.S. Defense Contractor #12 |
USA |
December 2009 |
1 |
| Canadian Government Agency #2 |
Canada |
January 2010 |
1 |
| U.S. Think-Tank |
USA |
April 2010 |
13 |
| Indian Government Agency |
India |
September 2010 |
2 |
Below are the complete timelines for each year of
intrusion activity. It could be an interesting exercise to map some of
these specific compromises to various geopolitical events that occurred
around these times (The gaps in the timelines for continuous infections
at specific victims may not necessarily be an indication of a successful
cleanup before a new reinfection, but rather an artifact of our log
collection process that did not mark every activity that occurred on the
adversary’s infrastructure, potentially leading to these gaps in the
data)






Although
Shady RAT’s scope and duration may shock those who have not been as
intimately involved in the investigations into these targeted espionage
operations as we have been, I would like to caution you that what I have
described here has been one specific operation conducted by a single
actor/group. We know of many other successful targeted intrusions (not
counting cybercrime-related ones) that we are called in to investigate
almost weekly, which impact other companies and industries. This is a
problem of massive scale that affects nearly every industry and sector
of the economies of numerous countries, and the only organizations that
are exempt from this threat are those that don’t have anything valuable
or interesting worth stealing.
Dmitri
P.S. I would like to thank Adam Meyers for the invaluable support and assistance he provided to us during this investigation
Update:
As we’ve worked further with the Korean Government on this
investigation, we have come to a conclusion that a Korean Government
agency was most likely not a victim of these intrusions. We are still
working to determine the identity of the victim organization
You can follow Dmitri Alperovitch, McAfee’s VP of Threat Research, on Twitter at http://twitter.com/DmitriCyber
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